. Our main result illustrates that secure implementation is too difficult in queueing problems since many reasonable domains satisfy weak indifference, for example, convex domains.
Introduction
In this paper, we consider queueing problems of allocating positions in a queue to agents, each of whom has a constant unit waiting cost, with monetary transfers. Examples of such problems are the use of large-scaled experimental installations, event sites, and so forth 1 .
Strategy-proofness is a standard property for nonmanipulability: The truthful revelation is a weakly dominant strategy for each agent. However, the strategyproof mechanism might have a Nash equilibrium which induces a non-optimal outcome. This problem is solved by secure implementation (Saijo, et al . [2] ), that is, double implementation in dominant strategy equilibria and Nash equilibria 2 . Previous studies illustrate how difficult it is to find desirable and securely implementable social choice functions: Voting environments (Saijo, et al. [2] ; Berga and Moreno [4] ), public good economies (Saijo, et al. [2] ; Nishizaki [5] ), pure exchange economies (Mizukami and Wakayama [6] ; Nishizaki [7] ), the problems of providing a divisible and private good with monetary transfers (Saijo, et al. [2] ; Kumar [8] ), the problems of allocating indivisible and private goods with monetary transfers (Fujinaka and Wakayama [9] ), Shapley-Scarf housing markets (Fujinaka and Waka-yama [10] ), and allotment economies with single-peaked preferences (Bochet and Sakai [11] ). This paper is most closely related to the one written by Fujinaka and Wakayama [9] . They show a constancy result on secure implementation when the domain satisfies minimal richness (Fujinaka and Wakayama [9] ). Our model is a special case of their one and have many reasonable domains which do not satisfy minimal richness. On the basis of this fact, we study the possibility of secure implementation in queueing problems. Unfortunately, our main result shows that only constant social choice functions satisfy strategy-proofness and strong non-bossiness (Ritz [12] ), both of which are necessary for secure implementation, on the domains satisfy weak indifference, which is weaker than minimal richness, introduced in this paper. This paper is organized according to the following sections. In Section 2, we introduce our model, properties of social choice functions, and domain-richness conditions. We show our results in Section 3. Section 4 concludes this paper.
Notation and Definitions
Let    
be a unit waiting cost for agent and i C  be a set of unit waiting costs for agent . For each i
be the utility function for agent such that for each and each
be the domain and i be a profile of unit waiting costs. For each
be a profile of unit waiting costs for agents other than agent . [2] show that strategy-proofness and strong non-bossiness are necessary for secure implementation. 
The social choice function f satisfies strong non-bossiness if and only if for each , 
The following example shows that many reasonable 
Remark 1 In our model, weak indifference is equiva

Results
lent to convexity 3 .
For simplicity of notation, let
c c C   and each i I  .
Preliminary Results
that the social choice func-
onetary transfer de d each
In this subsection, we assume tion f satisfies strategy-proofness.
Le a 1 shows that each agent's m mm pends on her position in the queue given unit waiting costs for other agents. Since the proof is similar to Fujinaka and Wakayama [9] , it is omitted.
there exists a unit waiting cost ch that some two different consumption bundles are indifferent in terms of utility level, then the position associated with the unit waiting cost is in between the two positions. In Lemma 2, we use the following notation: 
oofness, we ; , , .
, we have and strategy-proofnes By the
. This is a conwe have a contradiction to strategy-proofness in the case of i Saijo [14] shows the following constancy re ch uch that  sult on "Nash" implementation: The social choice function satisfies Maskin monotonicity and dual dominance (Saijo [14] ) if and only if it satisfies constancy. In line with such domination, Fujinaka and Wakayama [9] show the following constancy result on "secure" implementation: The securely implementable social choice function satisfies non-dominance (Fujinaka and Wakayama [9] ) if and only if it satisfies constancy. Note that nondominance is weaker than dual dominance 7 . In our model, similar to the relationship between minimal richness and weak indifference, we have a constancy result on secure implementation by a weaker condition than non-dominance as follows: for each 
Ma
